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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (3)(j) and Artie]e VIII 
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution. 
V. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellants (Atkinsons) sued the defendants Stephen G. 
Morgan (Morgan), and Morgan, Scalley & Reading for legal 
malpractice which caused the appellants to accept an unfair 
settlement agreement for their brain-damaged son. Atkinsons 
sued defendants IHC Hospitals, Inc. (IHC) and its settlement 
agent Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. (Wetzel) and Wetzel's 
employees, and Scott Olsen (Olsen) for fraud and for negligent 
misrepresentation. Atkinsons also sought a declaratory judgment 
to construe the parties' settlement agreement as requiring IHC to 
pay for therapy and custodial care costs. Appellants also asked 
the Court to declare the validity of a tacked on note to the 
settlement agreement which may prohibit Atkinsons from suing 
other tortfeasors without IHC's consent. (R. 2-19) 
This is an appeal from two J owe]* court orders grant inu 
summary judgment to all defendants and denying Atkinsons' nmtion 
to amend the complaint. (R. 430-432, 390-393, 607-G09.) 
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VI. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR.REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are: 
1. Whether attorney Morgan had a duty to Atkinsons and 
whether Morgan breached that duty. 
2. Whether a release induced by fraud bars appellants' 
subsequent claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation; 
3. Whether a probate court approved settlement agreement 
collaterally estops plaintiffs from bringing subsequent claims 
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 
4. Whether the applicable statute of limitation bars 
plaintiffs' claims against IHC, their independent insurance 
adjuster, and the insurance adjuster's employee. 
5. Whether the Court erred in granting summary judgment 
dismissing appellants' claims for declaratory relief. 
6. Whether the court abused its discretion in denying 
plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. 
VII. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3 (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(29) (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(30) (1953) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-26-(3) (3953) 
Utah Const. Art. I §11 
Utah Const. Art. I §24 
U.S. Const. Amend XIV 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15 
The text of the constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are set forth in the addendum of this brief. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Chad Atkinson, a minor suffered permanent and extreme brain 
damage while a patient at Primary Children's Medical Center. 
Primary Children's Medical Center is a facility owned by JHC. 
Within 4 months of Chad's accident the Atkinsons entered into an 
inadequate settlement agreement with IHC. Atkinsons were 
represented by Stephen G. Morgan of Morgan, Scalley & Reading. 
Morgan did not disclose to the Atkinsons that he was also 
representing IHC. 
The Atkinsons brought this action against Stephen G. Morgan 
and his law firm for legal malpractice. The Atkinsons also sued 
IHC, its claims adjuster, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and 
Wetzel's employee, Scott Olsen for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. These defendants misrepresented to the 
Atkinsons the condition of their baby Chad. 
The Atkinsons also sought a declaratory judgment t'> construe 
the settlement agreement as requiring IHC to pay for therapy and 
institutional and custodial living costs incurred by the 
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Atkinsons in caring for Chad. The Atkinsons also asked the 
Court to enter an order declaring whether the Atkinsons must 
obtain permission from defendant IHC prior to bringing an action 
against other tortfeasors. 
The lower court granted each and every defendant's motion 
for summary judgment and denied appellants' motion to amend tlieir 
complaint to allow a claim for medical malpractice. 
IX. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Roger and Polly Atkinson are the parents and guardians 
ad litem of Chad Atkinson. (R. 4, 12, 20-23, 77; 644, pp. 4, 12; 
R. 647, pp. 4, 177.) 
2. At the time of the settlement agreement, Polly 
Atkinson was 16 years old. Neither Roger or Polly had progressed 
beyond the 10th grade and neither are high school graduates. (R. 
644, pp. 4,5; 647 pp. 4,6.) 
3. IHC is a health care provider and the owner and 
operator of Primary Children's Medical Center. (R. 2, 40.) 
4. Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. is the contract insurance 
adjuster for IHC. (R. 2, 40) 
5. Scott Olsen, is an employee of Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc. (R. 2, 40) 
6. Morgan, Scalley & Reading is a law firm in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R. 2, 68) 
7. Stephen G. Morgan is an officer and shareholder in 
Morgan, Scalley & Reading. (R. 2, 68) 
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8. Chad Atkinson was born on March 2, 1983. Later, while 
a patient at IHC's Primary Children's Medical Center, Chad 
aspirated filling his lungs with digestive material. Previously, 
the hospital nurse shut off the machine's warning device 
monitoring Chad. Chad was deprived of oxygen, causing him to 
suffer extensive and permanent brain damage. (R. 645, p. 7, 
13; R. 647, p. 105.) 
9. After the injury of Chad Atkinson, the doctors at 
Primary Children's Hospital misrepresented Chad's condition to 
the parents. They told the Atkinsons their child would be normal 
and healthy. (R. 645, pp. 28, 29; R. 647, pp. 17, 18, 31, 33, 
38. ) 
10. Within a few days after Chad was discharged from the 
hospital, IHC contacted the Atkinsons asking them to come in for 
a visit. (R. 653, pp. 19-26.) 
11. The parents thought Wetzel was demanding payment for 
the hospital bill. (R. 644. pp. 35, 39, 85, 86.) 
12. At Wetzel's request, the Atkinsons met with Scott 
Olsen, the manager of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. four or five 
times. (R. 653, p. 5, 269-270.) 
13. Scott Olsen also misrepresented Chad's condition to the 
parents. He told the Atkinsons their child would be normal and 
healthy. (R. 647, pp. 45, 53, 54; 644, pp. 75, 108, 10«.) 
14. After Roger met with Olsen four or five times, olsen 
presented to Roger what Roger understood to be as Primary 
Children's Hospital's final offer. (R. 644, pp. 83, 84.) 
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15. Roger and Polly asked Olsen about seeing an attorney to 
advise them regarding the offer. (R. 653, p. 48.) 
16. Olsen recommended Steve Morgan, because Morgan was not 
the attorney for IHC, and Olsen believed that Morgan would be 
concerned for the Atkinsons. Polly and Roger Atkinson consulted 
with Morgan because he was recommended by Olsen. (R. 65 3, pp. 
49, 50.) 
17. At the time of the consultation, IHC's attorneys were 
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell. However, Morgan was the attorney 
for Scott Wetzel Services, the negotiating agent for IHC, a fact 
not disclosed by Olsen or Morgan. Thereafter, Roger and Polly 
met with Morgan prior to having the court appoint them as 
conservators for Chad Atkinson. (R. 332-335.) 
18. Morgan only read portions of the documents and failed 
to explain the documents to them. (R. 332-335.) 
19. Further, Morgan never allowed Roger and Polly to 
examine the pleadings and court papers until after the court had 
approved the settlement and it was made final. Therefore, the 
plaintiffs were not given the opportunity to find out for 
themselves that Morgan represented IHC. (R. 332-335.) 
20. Morgan did not investigate the facts of the underlying 
settlement. 
21. Morgan did not tell the Atkinsons he represented Scott 
Wetzel Services or IHC. (R. 332-335.) 
22. Morgan did not advise the Atkinsons that they shouJd 
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seek another attorney because he represented Scott Wetzel 
Services and IHC. (R. 332-335.) 
23. Morgan represented to Roger and Polly that the 
settlement would not be approved by the court unless it was fair. 
(R. 652, p. 33.) 
24. At Court, Morgan entered his appearance on the record 
as attorney for Roger and Polly Atkinson. (R. 332-335.) 
25. When Probate Court Judge Fishier asked whether Roger 
and Polly had seen an attorney, they replied yes, because they 
had seen Stephen Morgan. (R.332-335.) 
26. During all these proceedings, Roger and Polly beJieved 
that Morgan was their attorney. (R. 332-335; 647, p. 83, 84, 
117, 118, 126, 127.) 
27. Morgan later obtained Roger and Polly's signatures to 
the settlement documents as revised by Morgan and his law firm. 
28. Morgan made changes in the settlement four days after 
the court hearing. (R. 334.) 
29. If the Atkinsons had known that Morgan represented 
Scott Wetzel Services or the health care providers, they would 
have sought other counsel, and not executed the settlement 
documents. (R. 334.) 
30. The settlement documents presented by IHC had a then 
present-day value of $118,000. (R. 653, p. 78.) 
31. The injuries sustained by Chad Atkinson are at least 
$3,000,000. 
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32. As a result of the defendants' misrepresentations and 
the conduct of attorney Stephen G. Morgan, the plaintiffs 
misunderstood the condition of their child and the value of the 
settlement agreement. They consequently accepted the inadequate 
offer. (R. 334.) 
33. Polly and Roger Atkinson did not realize that Chad was 
not going to be a normal child until he was a little over three 
years old. (R. 644, 647.) 
34. The Court granted IHC, Wetzel, and Olsen's Motions for 
summary judgment, not because there were not any factual issues, 
but because the judge believed either (1) the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, and/or (2) the settlement agreement, and/or 
(3) the statute of limitations barred Atkinsons claims. (R. 267-
278, 52-58, 590-593, 655.) 
X 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A FACT ISSUE EXISTS AS TO WHETHER 
MORGAN HAD A DUTY TO ATKINSONS; AND WHETHER 
MORGAN'S CONDUCT BREACHED THAT DUTY. 
The record factually establishes that attorney Morgan had a 
duty to the Atkinsons. Atkinsons believed Morgan was their 
attorney. Morgan told them ho was their attorney. Atkinsons 
sought and received legal advice from Morgan. Further, in Court 
and on the record, Morgan stated that he represented "them". (R. 
109-195.) 
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There are numerous legal theories which support the idea 
that Attorney Morgan had a duty to the Atkinsons. Morgan could 
be liable under theories of (1) express contract; (2) implied 
contract; (3) limited attorney/client relationship; (4) third 
party liability; or (5) volunteering legal advice. 
POINT TWO 
MORGAN'S CONDUCT WAS BELOW THE 
STANDARD OF CARE. 
Morgan's conduct in assisting the Atkinsons in obtaining 
court approval of an inadequate settlement agreement was below 
the standard of care required of experienced attorneys. 
For example, Morgan effectively told the Atkinsons that the 
Judge could not approve the settlement agreement unless it was 
fair. That advice was hogwash. Second, Morgan represented that 
the settlement agreement was fair when the agreement clearly was 
inadequate. Third, Morgan failed to advise Atkinsons against 
settling their claims, until the extent of Chad's injuries were 
known. Fourth, Morgan failed to disclose to the Atkinsons that 
he also represented Wetzel and IHC. 
POINT THREE 
OTHER ARGUMENTS RAISED BY MORGAN 
IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Morgan argued that his malpractice did not cause Atkinsons' 
injuries. The record is counter to Morgan's assertions. Thp 
Atkinsons testified that they had not accepted the settlement 
proposed prior to seeing Morgan. "That's why we went to see a 
lawyer." (R. 64, p. 90.) 
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Morgan, IHC, Wetzel and Olsen also claimed that Atkinsons 
have only two alternatives: to rescind the agreement or affirm 
the agreement. The law states otherwise. The Atkinsons have the 
right to rescind the agreement or sue for damages. They chose to 
sue for damages. 
POINT FOUR 
ANY DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE SHOULD RE 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ATKINSONS' RIGHT TO SET 
ASIDE THE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
To this point in the litigation, the Atkinsons have not pled 
to vacate or rescind the original agreement. However, because 
the probate court abandoned its duty to evaluate the fairness of 
the settlement, the settlement may be vacated, if Atkinsons 
choose to do so. Centala v. Navrude, 186 N.W.2d 35 (Mich.App. 
1971) . 
POINT FIVE 
IHC, WETZEL AND OLSEN MISREPRESENTED 
THE CONDITION OF CHAD ATKINSON TO THE PARENTS. 
The record establishes that IHC, Wetzel and Olsen also 
represented to the Atkinsons that the baby was "okay", "doing 
well", "should be fine when we took him home, was at an age 
fashionable level. . . progressing like a normal baby", that 
Atkinsons "would be getting free money." 
The Atkinsons believed IHC, Wetzel and Olsen and accepted 
the inadequate settlement agreement. Further, the 
representations were false. "They told me my son was going to 
end up being a normal child. . . My child don't talk, don't walk, 
don't crawl. He just lays there. (R. 644, p. 108.) 
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POINT SIX 
THE RELEASE SIGNED BY THE ATKINSONS 
DOES NOT BAR ATKINSONS' CLAIMS AGAINST 
IHC OR IHC'S CONTRACT ADJUSTERS. 
T n arpopting -the i nadequate settlement agreement f t he 
Atkinsons signed a release. However, the release does not bar 
A t k I •: - - • s •  a i in s b e c a \ 1 s e i 
rhe release does not apply to IHC's Contractors Wetzel 
and O i sen r 
, ' i';.'J.~' : i - 1 • * • ' 
Chad's accident, not ••iaims -M frau-j a:i; negligent 
misrepresentation: ^-j 
i e 1 e a s e i i idi 1ced lb;> f i: ai 1 :1 3n : n t:i srepresentation does 
p' bar anything. 
POINT SEVEN 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT 
BAR ATKINSONS' CLAIMS FOR FRAUD AND 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
Co] 1 atei: a] est oppe 1 does i Iot: bar A. 1: k :i nsons r c 1 a i ins for fraud 
-i*~ J n^ «jj] iq-M^ misrepresentation because: 
• - 1 lateral estoppel never applies to decisions or 
. J ;u B :i i ipoi I sett] ernei it agr* ''-m*- -*' i . 
(2) Further, the elements necessary for collateral estoppel 
are not present ;- *iiu- case. The issues are not identical. 
There is iic £ -• •. •. < M-Mit on the merits and the probate 
proceeding did not invite litigation. 
POINT EIGHT 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT B A R 
ATKINSONS' CLAIMS. 
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The medical malpractice statute of limitations does not bar 
Atkinsons' claims for several reasons: 
First, the statute applies only to health care providers. 
Wetzel and Olsen are not health care providers. 
Second, the statute applies only to medical malpractice 
claims. Atkinsons' claims are for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. 
Third, Atkinsons brought their claim within 2 years of 
discovery of the malpractice. 
Further, if the medical malpractice statute of limitations 
is applied to Atkinsons' claims, the statute is unconstitutional 
and Chad would be denied his rights to equal protection and 
access to the Courts guaranteed by Article I Section 11, and 24 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) does not bar Atkinsons' claims 
because Atkinsons brought the action well within 3 years after 
learning the facts of the fraud. 
POINT NINE 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING ATKINSONS' 
CLAIMS FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 
The settlement agreement entered into between the Atkinsons 
is ambiguous and contradictory. It is ambiguous because it 
doesn't say whether IHC must pay (]) costs of 
institutionalization, (2) custodial care costs, and (3) all 
therapy costs. 
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jf- j
 ? rontrad, ..i,iy oecause in one par-j JL-if. h i. . : 
Atkinsons to -M<- all tortfeasors other t har I Ht . while n another 
\. i : r M • • sons from s u m g other tortfeasors 
'v i! i^ut I Hi .- consent. 
Atkins -MS askpd the Con:* + : interpret the contract 1 O 
- i - t » • • i * • * " - t i ! " a - i ' • | 
pr ^ h ib 11 ; n j -v k i ns^i : J * ;«' suing othet lurt.Leasors is valid. The 
Court lariea l^ JL> either. 
POINT TEN 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
lt:,l<.> i ATKINSONS' MOTION T:'j AMEND THEIR COMPI .All IT. 
Atkins Tis sough' * ^  m • *• T !>••!?• complaint by adding a claim 
* * m e mution was not frivo! ^ -. Further, 
:
5
 .-i - i. ' Lwugiit *i : ^^T-*-^, and no one argued tr.e amendment 
^ • i create m v un*;s> r;< : , -j • ouv*t abused its 
• 1 1 .-< j • i ' IP" 11 i i ii) I i i H I M ' i n | i i | , j | I) i 
XI 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
A FACT ISSUE EXISTS AS TO WHETHER MORGAN 
HAD \ DUTY TO ATKINSONS; AND WHETHER MORGAN'S ' N5 ; "n 
BREACHED THAT DUTY. 
A. Introduc t ion. 
Morgan represented Atkinsons during probate hearings to 
settle a medical malpractice action. Atkinsons claim that Morgan 
was negligent (See generally Statement of E"acts section above.) 
B. Factual Basis for the Duty. 
13 
The following facts support a finding that Morgan was 
negligent: 
Q: [To insurance adjuster] 
What happened next? 
A: I told them [Atkinsons] that they would 
have to have an attorney finalize this 
with the Court. 
Q: [To insurance adjuster] 
What did they say? What did Roger 
or Polly say? 
A: They asked if I knew of an 
attorney. 
Q: [To insurance adjuster] 
And then what did you say? 
A: I said, "Yes, I do know of an 
attorney that you could use, but 
you' re free to get whomever you 
want. But I know of one." 
Q: [To insurance adjuster] 
Then what happened? 
A: [T]hey asked who the attorney was 
that they didn't want to go to all 
the trouble of finding an attorney 
to do this, and so they asked me to 
get the attorney, (emphasis 
added.) 
Q: [To insurance adjuster] 
What did they say? 
A: Specifically, I don't remember, 
but it was generally, "How can we 
get a hold of him," or such. And 
I said, "He or his office will 
contact you. i will talk to him 
and he or his office will contact 
you. " 
(R. 653; pp. 48:14 to 49:13. 
Q: [To insurance adjuster] 
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Why did you recommend Steve 
Morgan? 
[T]he second reason is because I 
have dealt with Steve in the past, 
and find him completely, one 
hundred percent honest, and I knew 
he would be concerned about the 
Atkinsons. (emphasis added.) 
' i 
* * * * 
[to Polly Atkinson] 
Tell me again your understanding 
of how you came to see -: Morgan. 
[ T ] hey to 1 d us I. hey wuuid g<- * •: 
lawyer and have him go over 
[ settlement document? ] w i t.h 
(R. 647 p. 83:13-18. 
* * * * 
Q: rTo Polly Atkinson] 
Now tell me what was said ana 
whom in this meeting with Mr. 
Morgan, 
A: We] 1 , we went i n and we sat down 
and he told us he was here to help 
us and go over the things. He told 
us he was here to represent us and 
help us wi th i t and go over the 
different things, try and explain 
the best he could what it meant to 
us and that. 
(h •; • J.) 
4* -A. 4- 4-
[To Polly Atkinson] 
Now, when you went to Mr. Morgan I 
think you said you felt like he 
was representing you? 
: 11 e t : • J :i i I s 1 i e \ i a s r e p r e s < 
( R 6 5 3
 f p 
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(R. 647, p. 117:20-22.) 
Q: [To Polly Atkinson] 
You thought he [Morgan] could 
fairly assess the two disputed 
sides of the claim? 
A: I don't know. They told me they 
would set us up with a lawyer, 
okay? He [Morgan] told us that he 
was there to help us and represent 
us in this• 
(R. 647, p. 118-) 
Q: [To Roger Atkinson] 
You didn't ever ask him if this is 
a good or bad deal, isn't that 
true? 
A: I think not. I think I did ask 
him that. 
Q: [To Roger Atkinson] 
What did he say? 
A: I don't recall. I think he asked 
us back if we thought it was 
fair.1 
(R. 644, p. 118:13 - 119:1. ) 
* * * * 
Q: [To Roger Atkinson] 
^Assuming, arguendo, that there was no attorney-client 
relationship, Morgan could not evade this question. When faced 
with a specific question, Morgan had a duty to advise Atkinson 
to seek independent legal advice. (Affidavit of C. Richard 
Henriksen, at para. 3; R. 235-238.) 
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Tell us what was said anu i 
in that meeting [the first 
mee t i n u ] wit.Ii Mr. Mo r gan . 
A; We We I ' J iHtt'jdU' B(J t< l f l i Hi do S l e V H 
Morgan, He sai-j h^ was -ur lawyer 
and w ;s to represent 
• • • * 
Q: [To Polly Atkinson] 
You didn't "tell him. yni . I i < 111 ' I 
understand it? 
1 felt real reassured. I le was i li ce 
to us and we trusted him. 
, V 1 ''•• ) 
|To Morgan] 
Okay, What was said by U le Atkinsons ai id 
yourself? 
[I] recall j.-;au x . t : :- - .
 :i- ,L ve 
got those documents <jnd I ^ m : d i J Ke to have 
you come in and sit down and I would like to 
go over them with you. And so after that 
initial conversation that I told you about we 
went into either my office or the conference 
room and I sat down and went over in detail 
each of the documents and reac I them, and 
explained them to Atkinsons. 
(emphasis added ) 
pp, 15:2 4-25; 16:6 -8; 1 7:24-25- Ifl?1 -3. ) 
[To Morgan] 
And this explanation took about how long? 
I.,-,,- i ., r n i h< -li r . 
* * * * 
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Q: [To Morgan] 
Go ahead. 
A: I took the opportunity to. . . answer any 
questions with regard to the documents that 
they may have had. 
(R. 652, pp. 19:23 and 20:8-11.) 
• * * * 
Q: [To Morgan] 
Do you have any specific recollection what 
you said about the Petition? 
A: So I attempted to explain to them these 
payments and what guaranteed meant and how 
these figures were arrived at. . . And I also 
explained how the total payouts to Chad and 
his parents, should Chad live a normal 
lifetime, of $1,280,000 was arrived at. 
Next document that I explained to them was 
the order approving settlement of a minor's 
claim. . . I read that document to them and 
explained to them that' in order for the Court 
to approve and sign this order that the Court 
would have to find that it was in all 
respects fair. 
(emphasis added.) 
(R. 652, pp. 20:17-18; 22:22-24; 25:20-22; 33:16-19.) 
k -k -k "k 
THE COURT: This is P-83-692, in the Matter 
of Chad Atkinson, a minor. 
MR. MORGAN: Steve Morgan representing them, 
(emphasis added.). . . 
THE COURT: Have you sought the advice of legal 
counsel in this matter? 
MRS. ATKINSON: I have talked to someone about it 
but we are not planning on getting a lawyer. 
THE COURT: Have you talked to a lawyer? 
MRS. ATKINSON: Yes. I've just asked him a few 
things about it, and he said that we should really 
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n o t - - we shouldn't 1 i a <> e t o s \ i e t: 1: 1 e n; t i f 1:1 i. • a y a i: e 
giving us an offer, 
(R. 189-195, Transcript of Hearing, : 4.3>, .,uLy _., L983 
(attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum iM uppusition to Defendant 
Morgan's Motion for Summary Judgmen* 
Q: Polly Atkinson] 
m trying to find out; w ^ r went on 
at the heariiiM • '. !iere. I 
need to know wh.jt this transcript 
means. Then he [the Court] said: 
"Have you got any legal counsel in 
this matter?" Then you said: 
"I've talked to someone about it 
) at we're not planning on getting a 
lawyer, " H-i-e I read that right? 
A: 
: Polly Atkinsoii | 
iuu didn't say you talked t. i Mr, 
Morga- f • < «J«-' advice, did /»u? 
0? [To Polly Atkinson] 
And he was there? 
*• Yes. 
• '•< d ! y At k i nsoi: ] 
The Court didn't ask him any 
questions about it , is that ti: i m? 
A: That's the only question the judge 
asked me about it, you know. I 
thought the judge knew he was my 
1awye r, I'm sorry. 
Q : ["' r < :> P o ] ] y A t k i nson] 
If the judge asked you that and 
you said you weren't planning on 
getting one, why did you say that? 
Because they set us up with a 
lawyer. We already had a lawyer. 
(R < J ) 
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* * * * 
Q: [To Roger Atkinson] 
Did you ask the judge if he 
thought it was okay? 
A: No, I thought that's what a judge 
was for. To make sure you got 
fair—whatever it's called— 
settlement or so forth. I thought 
that's why you have to go to a 
judge. 
Q: [To Roger Atkinson] 
You figured if he didn't think it-
was okayf he'd tell you not to do 
it? 
A: I figured that much, yes. 
(R. 644, p. 120:16-24.) 
• * * * 
July 28, 1984: 
Steve Walkenhorst [from Morgan's 
office] met with Mr. and Mrs. 
Atkinson and received from them an 
itemized list of the expenditures 
made by the Atkinsons for the 
benefit of Chad, during the first 
year following court approval of 
the settlement. Mr. and Mrs. 
Atkinson explained many of the 
itemized expenses during the 
meeting. . . 
July 30, 1984: 
Steven Walkenhorst [from Morgan's 
office] called Scott Olsen [Scott 
Wetzel Services, Inc.] to ask if 
Intermountain Health Care would pay 
an attorney to assist the 
Atkinsons in filing the annual 
accounting. Scott said that it 
would. Steve Walkenhorst called 
Mr. Atkinson to tell him that an 
attorney would be paid to prepare 
the annual accounting. . .Mr. 
Atkinson was agreeable to have the 
annual accounting done this way. 
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(Defendant Morgan's Answers \-.- Plaintiti s First 6^1 ot 
Interrogatories, November 24, 1987..;. 
There are numerous theoi ies under wl i I« ::.! I ai I attorney may have 
a duty to another. '• Mallet- : -^. •'»• Legal Malpractice, 
§§5 ] 7 1 3 ( :l ' "!,,or ies tl lat apply in this 
case are as L o i1ows: 
1. Implied Contract. 
create the a * t orney-cl ient re i * t lon^nj p L'he reldtiunsh Lp can 
!(
 mp] ied from th^ "ir^'im^^ Tin^°'- 1 a r j u j ,* • s v . Upc hurc h , 696 
\r :.. i ; i !-, , . . :< x- r e - R s s o r v • •• .• ~ • . 
pa\ a fee before an -it toi n^v -<- Lent; rel a ti onsh Lp exists. Adger 
v. btat«=r, -i * i ^  / o t 
P>- basi- i ^ t * letermine t..«~ it torney/client 
relationship i- whether Atkinsons, sought ai id received advice and 
_i - - . s t . i . ^ r L^ ' ! 7 9 6 (Ar i z . 
1987) iowever an .mpottdn:. :acto; LP iiai'i:.^  the determination 
i- whether the client b^ij>->ves or lnren-is ' i.nt sn-*h : 
:
 ' •
 !
" * ' ' • _i__J_ii__! ^ e t r i e ,
 L ^^ j_; utate v. Billet , o 2 
P. 2d -^n f *„.,:-•: f V:; - iJ^ formality i.^  n:^ necessary. 
Therefore f h^ !'"iirt si iouJ d 1 ook to the words ~uid actions of the 
pdifl.es, n: r\e: Fetrie, supra; Hashemi v. Shack, 609 F.Supp. 
39] , 393 (S ' M v 19 34) . 
Where the evidence is in conflict as to whether there is an 
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attorney/client relationship, the fact finder must resolve 
factual disputes. Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10 (Cal.App. 1956). 
2. Limited Attorney-Client Relationship.2 
Morgan argued below, that he was employed for a 
limited purpose (to present the settlement papers to the Court) 
and that the limited purpose was satisfied. Assuming, arguendo, 
that Morgan was hired for a limited purpose, Morgan still had a 
duty to advise Atkinsons that they needed additional legal 
services and that Morgan would not be providing the services. 
Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Ky.App. 1978): 
An attorney cannot completely disregard 
matters coming to his attention which should 
reasonably put him on notice that his client 
may have legal problems or remedies not 
precisely or totally within the scope of the 
task being performed by the attorney. 
3. Third Party Liability. 
Most courts find that an attorney can have a duty to 
third parties even when there is no privity of contract. In some 
cases, courts impose liability as a matter of policy. Lucas v. 
Hamm, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961); Estate of Douglas, 428 N.Y.S.2d 
558 (1980). However, the predominant test is simply whether the 
contracting parties (Morgan and IHC Hospitals) intended to 
benefit the third party (Atkinsons). If so, Morgan has a duty to 
Atkinsons. Formento v. Joyce, 522 N.E.2d 312 (Ill.App. 1988); 
Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberon Investment, 512 So.2d 192 (Fla. 
^Morgan must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
the contract was for a limited purpose. Blake v. Blake, 412 
P.2d 454, 456 (Utah 1966) . 
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i
 " Flaherty v . Weinoerj . zu b i * *:y . iy 6 5; . Whether 
pdities intended to benef*f .. . d party u> d fact issue 
Flaherty, supra. see generally, Lawyer Malpractice: Duty 
Relationships Bey ^ji=, . .niiait..,, '» ' • ; 
Attorneys' Negligence and Third Parties, ;26 
(19 82) ; Am" * -r : • n, Attorney Liability to Other than Immediate 
Client for Negligence in Connection with Lega J i;u. . »-• , • I 
A „ L, R,4i h l" ." " f 1 98H) , 
4 • vuiunteej: . 
Even i f there was no attorney/client relati onship, 
Morgan can ;^e held iidi r- J1 11*- volunteered legal advice to 
(h t* ] '•"• • attorney gratis i * ous 1 \ explained ui'.jing 
documents • --i- * - <- J! S based upon common law 
M> (iy* - Stewart v. Sbarro, 362 A.2d 5H • .: h • jr 
liability .'• i>t> t-* --«« IT <i* u^n^i . Simmers on v. Blanks , 254 
Even . * n , nwer g I v^s only cpat J;K us advir^, he is 
boun-i i •- r'^  •- -ime standard nf ^ a r e a s ,* }v-. h^i N - ^ t.-Mnia!ly 
retdi.K. franko v. Mitchell, *?2 . i - . > 1988). 
'n summary,, a fa- : lal issue exists s^ t ;* whether Morgan had 
* •- Atkinsons and whether he breached the duty. There 
is a legal basis for the duty under theories of (] ) implied 
contrac*; - limited client relationship; ;J) third party 
li. ;i i , J v. : 11 j 111 e e i" i. n < j J ^  g .• i I. .'id v i r e . 
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POJNT TWO 
MORGAN'S CONDUCT WAS BELOW THE STANDARD OF CARE 
A. Advice Regarding Role of the Judge. 
Morgan testified that he "reviewed" with plaintiffs a 
document titled "Order Appointing Conservator." In the course 
of reviewing that document, Morgan explained to plaintiffs that: 
[I]n order for the Court to approve and sign 
this Order that the Court would have to find 
that the settlement was in all respects was 
fair. 
(R. 652, p. 33.) 
Atkinsons believed and relied upon Morgan's advice: 
Q: [To Roger Atkinson] 
Did you ask the Judge if he thought 
it was okay [the settlement]? 
A: No, I thought that's what a judge 
was for, to make sure you got fair 
-- whatever it's called — 
settlement or so forth. I thought 
that's why you had to go to a 
judge. 
Q: You figured if he didn't think it 
was okay, he'd tell you not to do 
it? 
A: I figured that much, yes. 
(R. 644, p. 120.) 
However, the judge could not make any conclusion about 
the fairness of this settlement because Morgan did not give the 
judge any facts about the underlying cause of action. (Tr. 
Hearing, July 22, 1983.) In fact, in this case, the judge did 
not even evaluate the underlying claim at all. (Deposition of 
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P h i ! i p H, -:..•_•: ; u • - F i s l ) ] er " 
depo. at_ ^compare Fishier dep'K -it ' :'Q-2rj.) 
Finally, a settlement is ?:->t -p.iranteed to be Mir ~i.mpl/ 
because a judge approves it. Centala v. Navrude, 
(Mich.App. 1971) . 
B • Adv ice Regardii lg 11 le V a 1 ue o£ 11 le Set11 ernent. 
Even though Morgan asserts that he was not Atkinson's 
attorney, l«.- . \>rit rati i f1t ed t hut assertion when he testified tiut 
example, Morgan says: 
And in the course of reading the document to 
the Atkinsons I wanted them to understand 
what guaranteed meant, and that is why we 
added the language, to clarify that 
guaranteed payment meant that if Chad, should 
die they, the parents, would stil1 receive 
the payments. (emphasis added.) 
* • • • * 
1 a J so explained to them these various 
figures and, for example, how $9Pfi nn0 was 
arrived at. 
* * * * 
So I attempted to explain to tl leni these 
payments and what guaranteed meant and how 
these figures were arrived at and I dicI 
that. 
* * * * 
And I also explained how the total payouts 
to Chad and his parents, should Chad live a 
normal lifetime, of $1,280,000 was arrived 
at 
(iv. vj^r pp. 21, 22, and 2 5.) 
25 
Morgan's advice was incorrect. The standard of 
practice would have required the attorney to explain the concept 
of "present value," (Affidavit of C. Richard Henriksen, Jr., R. 
235-238.) . 
Neither Roger (father) nor Polly (mother) ever 
graduated from high school.^ (See generally Statement of Facts 
Section of this brief.) The sum of $1,280,000 sounded like a 
fortune to those kids. Without proper legal advice, they had no 
way of knowing that the "present value" or cost of the $1,280,000 
annuity was a mere $118,000. (R. 653, p. 78.) 
Compare this case with Nelson v. Nationwide Mortgage, 659 
F.Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1987). In Nelson the attorney attended a 
real estate closing and gave the impression that he was 
representing all parties. The attorney read and explained 
documents. The district court ruled that the attorney can be 
held liable for negligence unless he can show that the reliance 
was unreasonable or unforeseeable. 
If plaintiffs had known the true facts, or if plaintiffs had 
received correct legal advice, they would not have made the 
settlement. (R. 332-336.) 
C. Premature Settlement. 
Atkinsons asked Morgan if the settlement was a "good 
deal." (R. 644, p. 118.) Morgan did not give a direct response, 
3EC 7-11 Utah Rules of Professional Responsibility ( In 
effect at time of the occurrence) states: "The Responsibilities 
of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, 
mental condition, or age of a client." 
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rather Morgan asked Roger Atkinson, the father, if he thought it 
was a good deal.4 (R. 644, p. 119.) Morgan also stated that the 
court would "find that the settlement was in all respects fair" 
before the order was signed. (R. 652, p. 33.) 
However, Morgan was always aware that, "nobody knew the 
extent of the brain damage," (R. 652, p. 51.) Any experienced 
attorney would advise against any settlement until the extent of 
the injuries was known. If Atkinsons had received proper advice, 
they would not have entered into the settlement. (R. 332-336.) 
D. Morgan Failed to Advise Plaintiffs to Obtain Independent 
Counsel. 
Morgan contends he was employed by Intermountaln 
Health Care to perform the necessary legal tasks of placing the 
financial settlement agreement before the Third Judicial District 
Court. (R. 652, p. 15.) If that was true,^ Morgan had an 
absolute conflict of interest. It was in the interest of 
defendant IHC to pay Atkinsons as little as possible. It was in 
the interest of IHC to settle the case before the full extent of 
the brain damage was known. It was in the interest of the 
Atkinsons to settle the case later, after the extent of the brain 
damage was known. 
4
 Morgan's evasive response was below the standard of 
care. (See Affidavit of Henriksen, at para. 2.) See also 
Dauqherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Ky.App. 78). 
J
 Plaintiff vigorously contends that an attorney-client 
relationship existed between the plaintiffs and defendant 
Morgan. See Point B above. 
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Faced with these circumstances, Morgan had a duty to 
disclose his conflict of interest. Further, Morgan had a duty to 
advise the Atkinsons to obtain independent counsel. In Re: 
Bishop, 686 P.2d 350 (Ore. 1984); (see Affidavit of Henriksen, 
R. 235-238.) See DR7-104 (A)(2) Utah Rules of Professional 
Responsibility;" 
During the course of his representation of a 
client [IHC] a lawyer shall not: (2) Give 
advice to a person who is not represented by 
a lawyer, other than the advice to secure 
counsel, if the interests of such person are 
or have a reasonable possibility of being in 
conflict with the interests of his client. 
If Atkinsons had been advised of Morgan's conflict of 
interest, they would have hired a separate attorney. (Affidavit 
of Roger Atkinson, R. 332-336. ) 
An independent attorney, observing the standard of 
care, would have disclosed and explained his conflicts of 
interest to the plaintiffs. (See Affidavit of Richard Henriksen, 
R. 235-238.) See also Rice v. Perl, 320 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 1982). 
POINT THREE 
OTHER ARGUMENTS RAISED BY MORGAN 
IN THE TRIAL COURT ARE WITHOUT MERIT 
Morgan raised a flurry of arguments in the trial 
court. The trial court judge granted summary judgment without 
6 The Rules were modified on January 1, 1988. The 
citation above relates to the Rules in effect as of the date of 
the occurrence. 
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giving his reasons as required by U.R.C.P. 52(a). Atkinsons will 
treat, briefly, those issues which appear to lack any merit: 
A. Proximate Cause. 
In the trial court, Morgan argued that there was no 
proximate cause to connect Morgan's alleged malpractice and 
damages. (Memorandum in Support of Morgan's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R. 163-164.) Morgan claims there was no proximate 
cause because the parties finalized their settlement before 
Morgan came on the scene. Also, Morgan claims that he was hired 
in a limited capacity to act as a schrivener. (Morgan 
memorandum, R. 164-169.) 
Morgan's assertions are vigorously disputed by the 
Atkinsons. Atkinson testified that the agreement was not final 
until after Morgan was hired: 
Q: [To Roger Atkinson] 
Before you went to the fifth 
meeting, had you and Polly decided 
to accept Scott Wetzel's proposal? 
A: I don't think so in full, that's 
why we went to see a lawyer. 
Q: Which lawyer? 
A: Steve Morgan. 
(R. 64, p. 90.) 
Moreover, the written contract, drafted by Morgan and 
executed after Morgan was hired, specifically disclaims any prior 
verbal agreements: 
The undersigneds further declare and 
represent that no promise, inducement or 
agreement not herein expressed has been made 
to the undersigned and that this release and 
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assignment contains the entire agreement. 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 16.) 
In addition, there could be no agreement before Morgan 
was hired. Chad Atkinson was an infant. The law requires that 
there be no contract on behalf of an infant before court 
approval. Utah Code Ann. §78-5-40 (1953). 
B. Election of Remedies. 
Morgan as well as IHC, Wetzel and Olsen, claim that 
Atkinsons have only two alternatives: (1) To rescind the 
agreement or (2) to affirm the agreement. Morgan argues that 
Atkinsons have chosen to affirm the agreement; and therefore, 
there is no cause of action against Morgan. (R. 175, 176, 53, 
54. ) 
In this case, Atkinsons seek damages caused by (1) the 
health care providers' fraudulent and negligent conduct and by 
(2) the negligent conduct of Steve Morgan. They are not seeking 
any double recovery. Thus the doctrine of election of remedies 
is inapplicable. Angelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 671 
P.2d 772 (Utah 1983) • 
If the Court construes Atkinsons pleading to raise an 
election of remedies issue, it is for Atkinsons, not Morgan to 
elect which remedy Atkinsons will pursue. Midvale Motors, Tnc. 
v. Saunders, 432 P.2d 37 (Utah 1967). Furthermore, the Court 
must protect the infant in making such an election: 
[T]t is the right and duty of the Court, even 
though it has appointed a representative for 
the infant, to protect the rights and 
interests of the infant party to litigation 
on its own motion. The rule applies. . . 
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whether or not the proper relief is asked in 
the pleadings. 
The Court is bound to notice substantial 
irregularities even though objections are not 
properly presented on the infant's behalf. 
43 C.J.S., Infants §220 (1955). 
Finally, a guardian ad litem cannot waive any substantial 
rights of the infant. In Re: Interest of Burbanks, 310 N.W.2d 
138 (Neb. 1981). 
POINT FOUR 
ANY DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE SHOULD BE WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE TO ATKINSONS' RIGHT TO SET ASIDE THE 
ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. 
To this point in the litigation, Atkinsons have not pled to 
vacate the original settlement agreement. Rather, Atkinsons seek 
damages (See Point Three above.) 
However, it is clear that the probate judge abandoned his 
duty to protect the infant. Indeed, the probate judge made 
no evaluation of the substance of the settlement.7 
(Fishier depo. at 51:21-23.) Since the Court did not evaluate 
the fairness of the settlement, the settlement may be vacated. 
"[T]he Court. . . may authorize, 
direct, or ratify any contract, 
trust, or other transaction 
relating to the protected person's 
financial affairs or involving his 
estate if the Court determines that 
the transaction is in the best 
interests of the protected person." 
U.C.A. §75-5-409(2) (1953) 
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Centala v. Navrude, 186 N.W.2d 35 (Mich.App. 1971); Decany v. 
Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 89.) 
Therefore, if Atkinsons' cause of action fails for any 
reason, this Court should affirm the judgment below, but without 
prejudice to Atkinsons' right to file a new claim to set aside 
the settlement agreement. (c.f. Centala, supra.) 
POINT FIVE 
IHC, WETZEL AND OLSEN MISREPRESENTED 
THE CONDITION OF CHAD ATKINSON, 
TO THE PARENTS. 
A. IHC Misrepresented the Medical Condition and Future of 
Chad Atkinson. 
After Chad was injured, Polly Atkinson, the mother, 
asked about her child. 
Q: Tell me what the nurse said. 
A: She just said that Chad was doing 
okay. 
(R. 647 at p. 11.) 
The mother also had numerous conversations with the IHC 
doctors 
Q: Tell me what Dr. Matlak told you 
about the seizure. 
A: He just told us that they had given 
him phenobarbital to stop him from 
having another seizure and got him 
to the point where he was 
comfortable again, wasn't having 
any more. That was about it, 
Q: Did Dr. Matlak tell you anything 
about the effect of that seizure. . 
? 
A: No he didn't. 
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(R. 647, pp. 17-18.) 
Q: DLd you have any conversations 
about Chad's prognosis? 
A: Well, he kept telling me how good 
he was doing and he was so happy he 
was doing so well. 
(R. 647, at p. 31.) 
Q: You said Dr. Matlak talked about 
Chad, what did he say about Chad? 
A: [H]e said that Chad should be fine 
when we took him home. . . 
(R. 647, p. 33.) 
A: [Dr. Thompson] said that Chad 
looked like he was doing really 
well... 
(R. 647, p. 38.) 
The doctors also misrepresented Chad's condition to the 
father. 
A: [D]r. Thompson said at one time 
that he [Chad] was at an age 
fashionable level where he was 
progressing like a normal baby... 
(R. 644, p. 30. ) 
A: They [the doctors] said he looked 
like he was doing fine. 
Q: Who said that? 
A: Dr. Matlak said he was ready to go 
home. 
(R. 644, p. 28.) 
A: [T]hey said he should grow up and 
be normal not be normal, but be 
a healthy baby. This is what I 
gathered in conversations with 
them. 
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(R. 644, at p. 29.) 
B. The Atkinsons Believed the Doctors. 
When the Atkinsons took their child home from the hospital, 
they believed Chad was healthy. 
Q: At the time you took Chad home from 
the hospital in late April of 1983, 
what was your understanding of 
Chad's condition. 
A: Well he was doing really really 
good. He looked real healthy. 
(R. 647, p. 76.) 
Q: What did you understand at this 
time his injury to be? 
A: From what we had gathered, he was 
doing fine, had recovered just 
fine. 
(R. 644, p. 28.) 
Q: Did you think at that time he was 
going to be normal? 
A: Yeah, from the way it looked, they 
said he should grow up and be 
normal - not be normal, but be a 
healthy baby. This is from what I 
gathered in conversations with 
them. 
(R. 644, p. 29. ) 
C. Scott Olsen of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. 
Misrepresented Chad's Condition to the Parents. 
Olsen misrepresented Chad's condition to the mother, Polly 
Atkinson. 
A: [Olsen] mentioned how good Chad 
looked. He was kind of telling us 
that he thought Chad looked great, 
he didn't look any worse for the 
wear. 
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(R. 647, p. 45.) 
A: They made it sound like everything 
was going to be fine with him and 
we were going to be getting this 
[money] for nothing. . . that's 
what Scott said at the final 
meeting. 
Q: What did Scott say? 
A: How good Chad looked, this will be 
really great, you'lL be able to do 
what you want with the money. . . 
A: He said it would be like getting 
money for nothing. He told us 
that. 
Q: In those words? 
A: Yes. 
A: He said. . . everything was going 
to be okay with him [Chad], he was 
doing so good and he was getting 
really well. 
A: [Olsen said] [t]he doctors had 
said to him he thought Chad was 
going to be fine. 
(R. 647, pp. 53, 54.) 
A: [Scott Olsen said] Chad would be 
well enough to where we wouldn't 
have a case anymore. 
(R. 647, p. 70.) 
Olsen also misrepresented Chad's condition to the father 
A: Olsen said, [lit looked like Chad 
was progressing pretty normally and 
was looking good. . . and that we'd 
be getting free money if anything 
because Chad should grow up fairly 
normal. 
(R. 644, p. 75.) 
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The Parents Believed IHC, Wetzel and Olsen and Accepted 
the Inadequate Settlement Offer, 
Q: At the time you signed the 
settlement agreement in July of 
1983, what was your understanding 
of Chad's condition? 
A: He was a baby. It looked like he 
was progressing great. He was 
doing fine. 
644, p. 109.) 
Q: At that time what was your 
understanding of Chad's condition? 
A: He was doing great. He was doing 
really really well. 
Q: Did you understand that he was 
brain damaged? 
A: No I didn't. 
Q: Did you understand that he would 
have any kind of permanent 
injuries? 
A: No. 
Q: Did you understand that he was 
different from a normal baby in any 
way? 
A: No. 
647, p. 73.) 
The Representations were False. 
A: They told me my son was going to 
end up being a normal child. My 
child is four years old and still a 
baby. My child don't talk, don't 
walk, don't crawl. He just lays 
there. 
Q: TeJ1 me who told you your child was 
going to progress normally. 
A: Scott Olsen and the doctors. 
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(R. 644, p. 108.) 
POINT SIX 
THE RELEASE SIGNED BY THE ATKINSONS 
DOES NOT BAR ATKINSONS' CLAIMS AGAINST 
IHC OR IHC'S CONTRACT ADJUSTERS. 
A. Introduction. 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, IHC, Wetzel 
and Olsen alleged that the Atkinson claims for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation were barred by the parties' signed 
release. (R. 255, 256, 272.) 
However, the release cannot support a summary judgment 
because: 
(1) The release does not apply to IHC's contractors, Wetzel 
and Olsen; 
(2) The release only applies to claims that result from the 
Chad's accident; and 
(3) A release induced by fraud or misrepresentation does 
not bar anything. 
B. The Release Does Not Apply to IHC's Independent 
Contractor, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., nor to 
Wetzel's Employee, Scott Olsen. 
The release signed by the Atkinsons applies only to 
"Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary 
Children's Medical Center or their agents, servants, successors, 
heirs, executors, [and] administrators." (R. 15.) 
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Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. was not an agent, servant, 
successor, heir or executor of IHC. It was an independent 
contractor, 
Q: What was your relationship with IHC at the 
time of the first meeting with the 
Atkinsons? 
A: [SJcott Wetzel Services had a contract to 
investigate, adjust, negotiate, evaluate 
claims that were assigned to us by the 
various hospitals and Intermountain Health 
Care, 
(R. 653, p. 24.) A copy of the contract is attached in the 
addendum to this brief. 
Scott Olsen was the claims manager for Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. He was an employee of Wetzel, not IHC. (R. 653, 
pp. 4, 6, 29, 33.) Therefore, the release does not apply to the 
independent contractor, Wetzel nor Wetzel's employee, Scott 
Olsen. 
C. The Release Does Not Apply to Atkinsons' Claims for 
Fraud and Misrepresentation. 
The release, on its face, applies only to "claims, actions, 
causes of actions, demands, rights, damages, costs, . . . 
resulting to or to result from the accident, casualty or event 
which occurred on or about the 4th day of March, 1983 at the 
Primary Children's Medical Center." (R. 15.) 
Atkinsons' claims are not claims for medical malpractice 
resulting from the negligent care inflicted by IHC on Chad 
Atkinson. Rather, the claims are for fraud and misrepresentation 
made by IHC's doctors, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott 
Olsen after the accident. 
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Two cases which hold that fraud is a separate claim distinct 
from medical malpractice are Watts v. Cumberland Co. Hospital 
System, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 242 (N.C.App. 1985) and Gaines v. 
Preterm-Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987). Because 
Atkinsons' claims are separate and distinct from the accident 
claims, the release does not apply to the Atkinsons claims. Its 
axiomatic that rights of action not expressly contained in a 
release are not barred by the release. e.g. Haco Drilling Co. v. 
Hammer, 426 P.2d 689 (Okl. 1967). 
D. A Release Obtained by Fraud Does Not Bar Anything. 
The Atkinsons' Complaint alleges that the settlement 
agreement and release were induced by the fraud of IHC, Scott 
Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen. 
Releases induced by fraud or misrepresentation may be 
avoided. Kelly v. Salt Lake Transp. Co., 116 P.2d 383 (Utah 
1941). The release is not binding. Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631 
(Idaho 1940). When confronted with a settlement, the alternative 
remedies are: 
1. Rescind the contract and sue for relief of 
the consideration paid or parted with by the 
plaintiff; or 
2. Retain the benefits of the agreement and sue 
for damages. 
Inman v. Merchant's Casualty Co., 27 App. Div. 320, 83 N.Y.S.2d 
801 (N.Y. 1948); Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631 (Idaho 1940); 
Southern Railroad Co. v. James, 140 N.E. 556 (Ind. 1923). In 
this case, plaintiffs seek damages caused by (1) the health care 
provider's fraudulent and negligent conduct and by (2) the 
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fraudulent and negligent conduct of Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. 
and its employee, Scott Olsen. 
A case directly on point is Automobile Underwriters v. Rich, 
53 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1944). In the Rich case, the plaintiff 
sought damages caused by an inadequate settlement agreement 
procured by fraud and misrepresentation. 
The court, in discussing plaintiff's alternative remedies, 
said: 
(1) He can. . • return whatever was received and 
bring suit on the original right of action. 
[or] 
(2) He can keep what he has received and file 
suit against the ones perpetrating the fraud 
and recover such amount as will make it an 
honest one. 
Id. at 777. 
The Atkinsons, in this case chose remedy (2). 
In summary, when a release is obtained by fraud or 
misrepresentation, the release does not prohibit the plaintiff 
from retaining the benefits of the settlement and suing those who 
perpetrated the fraud for damages. The release does not bar 
Atkinsons' claims of fraud and misrepresentation against IHC, 
Wetzel and Scott Olsen. 
POINT SEVEN 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT BAR ATKTNSONS' 
CLAIMS FOR FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
A. Introduction. 
In support of their motions for summary judgment, IHC, Scott 
Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen asserted that collateral 
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estoppel prohibits Atkinsons' claims for fraud and 
misrepresentation. (R. 273-275.) 
However, collateral estoppel never applies to decisions or 
judgments based upon settlement agreements. Further, three out 
of the four required collateral estoppel elements are not present 
in this case. Therefore the doctrine of collateral estoppel does 
not bar the Atkinsons' claims. 
B. Collateral Estoppel Never Applies to Decisions or 
Judgments Based on Settlement Agreements. 
Collateral estoppel "precludes relitigation only of issues 
actually tried in a prior action. . . . " Robertson v. Campbell, 
674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983). Because parties settle for a myriad 
of reasons not related to the resolution of the issues they are 
litigating, collateral estoppel is not applied when the judgment 
is based on a settlement agreement. Krikava v. Webber, 716 P.2d 
916 (Wash.App. 1986); Marquardt v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co., 658 
P.2d 20 (Wash.App. 1983). 
C. All the Elements Necessary to Apply Collateral Estoppel 
Do Not Exist in This Case. 
Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of issues that 
have once been litigated. It prevents parties from relitigating 
facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in 
the first suit. Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246, 247-48 (UtahApp. 
1987); Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). 
The following four elements must be present before 
collateral estoppel can be applied: 
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1. The issue decided in the prior adjudication 
must be identical to the issue presented in 
the subsequent litigation. 
2. There must be a final judgment on the merits. 
3. The party against whom the plea is asserted 
must be a party or in privity with a party to 
the prior adjudication, 
4. The issue in the first case must be 
completely, fully and fairly litigated. 
Searle Brothers, at 691; Berry, supra. 
If any of these four elements is not satisfied, then summary 
judgment, based on collateral estoppel, is not available. Berry 
supra at 24 8. 
Three out of the four collateral estoppel elements are 
missing in the present case. First, the issues in this case are 
not identical to the issues in the prior conservatorship 
proceeding. The issues in the conservatorship proceeding were: 
1. Should Scott Kelly's Petition for Conservatorship on 
the part of the parents be granted? 
2. Is the settlement agreement, on its face, so 
unreasonable that the conservators should not be authorized to 
accept it? (Fishier depo. at pp. 8, 10.) 
In the present case, the issues are: 
1. Did IHC and/or Scott Olsen and/or Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. fraudulently, or negligently misrepresent: (a) 
Chad's condition; and/or (b) the value of the settlement? 
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2. If so, did the parents reasonably rely on the 
misrepresentations? 
3. Were the parents and Chad damaged by the 
misrepresentations? e.g. Taylor v. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1980); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 
P.2d 302 (Utah 1983). 
The issues in the present case plainly are not identical to 
the issues in the perfunctory conservatorship proceeding. 
Second, there was not a judgment on the merits. A judgment 
not rendered on the merits may not be used as a basis for the 
application of collateral estoppel. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments §477 
(2d ed. 1969). See In Re; West Jordan, 7 U.2d 391, 326 P.2d 105 
(1958). A judgment is not on the merits when it is obtained by 
consent. see Restatement (Second) Judgments §20. 
Finally, the issues in the prior proceeding were not fully, 
completely, or fairly litigated. In fact, there was no 
litigation, none. No summons or complaint was ever filed or 
served, no answer was ever filed. Only one attorney appeared at 
the conservatorship proceedings, held without notice, and he 
apparently represented all of the parties. "Mr. Morgan: Steven 
Morgan representing them" (Tr. July 22, 1983, p. 1.) The 
appointment of a conservator does not qualify as a full, fair and 
complete litigation. In fact, the judge approved the settlement 
to avoid the "inherent risk of litigation." (Fishier depo., p. 
50. ) 
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POINT EIGHT 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BAR ATKINSONS' 
CLAIMS AGAINST IHC, SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC. AND 
SCOTT OLSEN FOR FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. 
A, Introduction. 
IHC, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen also based 
their summary judgment motions on the statute of limitations. 
They argued that Atkinsons' claims for fraud and 
misrepresentation were barred either by Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4, 
the two year medical malpractice statute of limitations, or Utah 
Code Ann. §78-12-26, the three year, after discovery of the 
fraud, statute of limitations. (R. 276-279.) 
The statute of limitations defense is meritless for several 
reasons. First, Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 applies only to health 
care providers, not Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen. 
Second, Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 applies only to medical 
malpractice claims, not to claims for fraud or negligent 
misrepresentation. 
Third, if Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 did bar Atkinsons' claims, 
it would violate Article I, Section 11 and 24 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Fourth, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) does not bar plaintiffs' 
claims because the parents did not learn of Chad's true condition 
until he was over three years old. They filed this action well 
within three years after learning the facts of the fraud. 
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B. The Medical Malpractice Statute does not bar 
Atkinsons' claims for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation against Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. 
and Scott Olsen. 
The 2-4 year medical malpractice statute of limitations 
contained in Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 js not applicable to 
Atkinsons' claims against Wetzel and Olsen. The medical 
malpractice statute applies only to actions "against a health 
care provider." 
[A] health care provider includes any person. 
. . corporation. . . or institution who. . . 
renders health care of professional services 
as a hospital, physician, registered nurse, 
[etc]. . . or agents of any of the above 
acting in the course and scope of their 
employment." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(1) (1953). 
"Health Care" means: 
fa]ny act or treatment performed or furnished 
by. . .by any health care provider for, to, 
or on behalf of a patient during the 
patient's medical care, treatment and 
confinement, 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3(30) (1953). 
Wetzel and Olsen are not health care providers because they 
did not furnish health care to the Atkinsons. They did not 
medically treat the Atkinsons and Atkinsons were not Wetzel's 
nor Olseirs patients. Further Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and 
Scott Olsen were not agents of the health care provider, IHC. 
They were independent contractors for purposes of claims 
adjusting. See Point Five of this brief.. Further, Atkinsons 
claims against Wetzel and Olsen did not arise out of any provider! 
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health care. They arose out of Wetzel's and Olsen's 
misrepresentations as to the value of the settlement and the 
condition and future of the Atkinsons' child. 
For these reasons, the medical malpractice statute of 
limitations simply and unequivocally does not apply to Atkinsons' 
claims against Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen. 
C. The Medical Malpractice Statute does not bar 
At ki ns ons ' claims for fraud and neglig ent 
misrepresentation against IHC. Atkinsons are not suing 
IHC for medical malpractice. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4 applies only to claims for medical 
malpractice. The medical malpractice statute reads in part: 
No medical malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be brought 
unless ..." Id. 
Utah Code Ann., §78-14-4 (1953). 
Malpractice action. . . means, any action 
against a health care provider, based upon 
personal injuries related to or arising out 
of health care rendered or which should have 
been rendered. . . (emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3 (29) (1953). 
Health care means any act or treatment 
performed or furnished or which should have 
been performed or furnished by any health 
care provider for, to, or on behalf of a 
patient during the patient's medical care, 
treatment or confinement. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-14-3 (30)(1953) 
Atkinsons' claims against IHC are not based upon a personal 
injury arising out of health care provided. Atkinsons' claims 
arise out of IHC's misrepresentations as to the fairness of the 
settlement and the condition and future of plaintiffs' child. 
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Fraud and misrepresentation claims are separate and distinct 
claims from medical malpractice claims. Gains v. Preterm-
Cleveland, Inc., 514 N.E.2d 709 (Ohio 1987); Watts v. Cumberland 
County Hospital System, Inc., 330 S.E.2d 242 (N.C.App. 1985). 
Because the fraud and misrepresentation claims are separate and 
distinct from medical malpractice claims, they are governed by 
the Fraud Statute of Limitations and not the Medical Malpractice 
Statute of Limitations. Id. 
The foregoing is consistent with Utah case law holding that 
when there is doubt as to which statute of limitations applies, 
the statute providing the longest period in which to file is 
preferred. Juab County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Summers, 426 
P.2d 1 (Utah 1967) . 
However, in this case there isn't any doubt. Atkinsons' 
claims are garden variety fraud and negligent misrepresentation 
claims. They are not medical malpractice claims. The medical 
malpractice statute of limitations does not bar Atkinsons' 
claims. 
D. If the Medical Malpractice Statute did bar Chad 
Atkinson's claim, the Statute would violate Article I 
Sections 11 and 24 of the Utah Constitution. 
1. The medical malpractice statute of limitations, if 
applied, violates Article I Sect. 11 (Open Courts) of the Utah 
Constitution. 
Article I Section 11 of Utah's Constitution guarantees open 
access to the courts: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him. . . shall have 
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remedy by due course of law. . . and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting. . . 
any civil cause to which he is a party. 
The Utah Medical Malpractice Statute, unlike Utah's other 
statutes of limitation has no tolling, provision for minors. Its 
effect, like a statute of repose, is to cut off a minor's claim 
before the minor can discover his claim. 
In Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), 
the Utah Supreme Court invalidated the Utah Products Liability 
statute of repose. The Court said that the statute violated the 
open courts provision of Utah's Constitution. The statute did 
not bar all claims outright. Rather, it only barred claims which 
arose a certain number of years after the injuring product was 
manufactured or sold. The Supreme Court quoted with approval 
Heath v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 464 A.2d 288, 294 (N.H. 1983), to 
the effect that the Utah Open Courts provision contemplates that 
plaintiffs will have a sufficient time, after a claim has 
accrued, in which to file. Berry, at 673-74. The court, 
therefore, broadly declared the statute unconstitutional because 
the plaintiff was "arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies 
designed to protect basic individual rights." Jd. at 675. 
The Utah Medical Malpractice anti-tolling statute deprives 
Chad Atkinson and all other similarly situated children of the 
effective remedies designed to protect their basic individual 
rights. Within the statutory limitation period, Chad Atkinson 
did not have sufficient understanding to discover his medical 
malpractice claim. Further, without a guardian, he was legally 
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incompetent to enforce any of his legal rights in a Utah court. 
U.R.C.P. 17. 
The protection of Chad's legal rights were left exclusively 
within the hands of his parents. However, many courts have 
recognized that minors' rights often go unprotected due to the 
inadequacies of their parents or guardians. See, e.g., Scott v. 
School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 
1977); Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital, 692 P.2d 280, 295-
96 (Ariz. 1984); and Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 
1983) . 
In states where an open court clause is interpreted to be 
more than a mere statement of philosophy, repose and anti-tolling 
provisions like those in Utah's Medical Malpractice Act are 
invalidated. Sax v. Votteler, supra; Barrio v. San Manuel 
Division Hospital, supra. These cases hold that such provisions 
unreasonably deprive minors of an effective remedy. 
Unlike adults which are granted some discovery period, Chad 
had no real opportunity to discover his medical malpractice 
claim. Even if he could comprehend his claim, he could not turn 
the key to the courthouse door without an adult acting for him. 
Chad's "effective remedies" would be taken from him by the 
Medical Malpractice Act's anti-tolling and repose clauses. The 
Utah Open Courts provision would therefor be vioLated it Utah 
Code Ann. §78-14-4 is applied to Chad's claims. 
2. If the medical malpractice statute of limitations is 
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applied, it violates the child's right to uniform and equal 
protection of the law. 
Further, if the Medical Malpractice Statute is construed to 
bar Chad Atkinsons' claims, then Chad Atkinson would be denied 
his right to uniform and equal protection of the laws guaranteed 
by Article I Section 24 of the Utah Constitution and the 14th 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
The right to bring a tort claim is an "important substantive 
right". Condemarin v. University Hospital, 107 Utah Adv.Rptr. 5 
(1989). In Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) this Court 
defined the minimal level of scrutiny a statute must pass to 
avoid an equal protection violation. Malan held that the 
classification must reasonably promote legitimate legislative 
objectives (I_d. at 670). Malan further held that classifications 
would be subject to a degree of judicial scrutiny. Malan 
expressly stated that it is unconstitutional to single out a 
group of plaintiffs "on the basis of a tenuous justification that 
has little or no merit" (Id. at 671). 
Section 78-14-4 discriminates between children injured by 
health care providers and children injured by all other tort 
feasors. The purpose of §78-14-4 is to lessen the great increase 
in insurance costs and premiums. Utah Code Ann. §78-14-2. 
However, studies show that less than one-seventh (1/7) of 
all medical malpractice claims involve minors. Jenkins, 
California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act on Equal 
Protection Challenge, 52 So.Cal.L.Rev. 829, 960-961 (1979). 
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Those same studies show that 90% of all medical malpractice 
claims are discovered within four years. (Id.) Courts 
recognize that most claims of minors will be brought quickly. 
Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hospital, 692 P.2d 280, 286 (Ariz. 
1984). Obviously, any effect that the long-tail claims of 
minors have on the medical profession can only be de minimus. 
Further, there certainly has been no showing that minor's 
long-tail claims have a meaningful effect on the medical 
insurance industry in Utah. Any such effect would be offset, to 
a degree by welfare, and is merely cumulative in light of all the 
other medical malpractice legislation that has been enacted. The 
need to discriminate against minors is therefore of "little or no 
merit" and does not satisfy Malan's equal protection test. 
Malan's directive that arbitrary classifications not be used just 
to lower premiums hammers that point home. 
Scott v. School Board of Granite School District, 568 P.2d 
746 (Utah 1977) supports the contention that this kind of 
discriminatory treatment of minors, violates Utah's equal 
protection clause. Although Scott did not involve the precise 
issues here, it expressly stated that failure to apply the 
general tolling provisions to the Governmental Immunity Act's 
notice provisions would "work a denial of equal protection." 
(Id. at 748). Other states have similarly held that failure Lo 
apply tolling provisions to similar notice requirements violates 
equal protection guarantees. Tafoya v. Doe, 670 P. 2d 582 (N.M. 
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App. 1983); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 529 P.2d 898 
(1974), aff'd. 539 P.2d 845 (Wash. 1975).8 
In Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court invalidated the part of a medical 
malpractice act which specified that the state's general statute 
of limitation tolling provisions for minors did not apply to 
medical malpractice claims. The court declared the right to 
bring a personal injury action to be an "important substantive 
right". 
In determining the constitutionality of New Hampshire's 
Malpractice Act, the court applied the following test: 
Whether the malpractice statute can be 
justified as a reasonable measure in 
furtherance of the public interest depends 
upon whether the restriction of private 
riqhts sought to be imposed is not so serious 
that it outweighs the benefits sought to be 
conferred upon the general public. (Id. at 
831. ) 
Holding that elimination of the tolling provisions for a 
minor's medical malpractice claims did not satisfy that test, the 
court found that the discrimination did not substantially further 
the legislative objective because of the small number of claims 
that would be affected. It further held that the non-tolling 
b
 Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) utilized the 
rational basis test to find Rhode Island's entire Malpractice Act 
unconstitutional, apparently on the grounds that the alleged 
crisis was not significant. 
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provision unfairly burdened medical malpractice claimants. (Id. 
at 834.) This Court should make the same ruling.^ 
E. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) Does Not Bar Atkinsons' 
Claims for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation. 
Atkinsons' alleged claims for negligent misrepresentation 
and fraud. Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) applies only to actions 
based on fraud. However, even if the 3-year statute of 
limitations applied to Atkinsons' claims for both fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation, the statute does not bar Atkinsons' 
claims because the statute does not begin to run "until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the 
fraud or mistake." Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) (1953). 
Atkinsons allege the defendants misrepresented the condition 
of their child. Chad was born on March 3, 1983. The Atkinsons 
did not discover Chad's true condition until Chad was over 3 
years old. 
Q. Did you understand that he [Chad] would have 
any kind of permanent injury? 
A. No. 
Q. What's your understanding of Chad's condition 
now? 
A. [H]e has athetoid quadriplegic. 
Q. When did you first learn that? 
A. I never really learned it. 
Q. At what point in time did you realize that 
Chad was not going to be a normal child? 
9
 Carson, was quoted with approval in Condomarin, supra, 
at 9. 
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A. When he was a little over three. 
(R. 647, pp. 80, 105.) 
In summary, the true condition of the child was not 
discovered until March, 1986. The case was filed on July 21, 
1987. The time allowed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(3) did not 
expire until March of 1989. The statute does not bar Atkinsons' 
claims. 
POINT NINE 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 
ATKINSONS' CLAIMS FOR A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT. 
Atkinsons sued IHC, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott 
Olsen for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. They sought 
damages caused by the Atkinsons' reliance on the 
misrepresentations made by defendants which resulted in an 
inadequate settlement agreement for their minor son, Chad 
Atkinson. (R. 2-12.) However, Atkinsons' CumplaLnt also sought 
a declaratory judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1 and 
§78-33-2. Specifically, Atkinsons asked the District Court to 
rule whether the settlement agreement: 
(1) Requires IHC to pay costs of institutionalization; 
(2) Requires IHC to pay occupational therapy costs; 
(3) Requires IHC to pay speech therapy costs, and; 
(4) Requires IHC to pay custodial care costs. 
The agreement specifically requires IHC to pay all medical 
costs, including treatment, hospitalization and therapy, but it 
54 
doesn't specifically say whether IHC must pay items (2), (3) and 
(4). (R. 15-16.) 
The agreement also requires IHC to provide whatever 
assistance is required to qualify for institutionalization, but 
it doesn't say whether IHC must pay the costs of 
institutionalization. 
Plaintiffs also requested the Court to declare whether 
Atkinsons must obtain the permission of IHC to sue other 
tortfeasors, i.e., the manufacturer of the hospital monitor. An 
explanatory note to the settlement agreement provides: 
[N]o action will be filed by the Atkinsons 
against any potential tortfeasors without 
the prior written consent of Intermountain 
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. (R. 19.) 
The explanatory note contradicts another part of the 
agreement which provides: 
This release and assignment should in no way 
limit or affect the Atkinsons' right to 
pursue claims against other potential 
tortfeasors excluding Intermountain Health 
Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's 
Hospital. (R. 15.) 
At the hearing for the approval of the settlement, the Judge 
understood that Atkinsons could pursue other tortfeasors. 
[M]y understanding was they had -- would have 
a right to pursue claims against other 
potential tortfeasors excluding IHC which was 
the petitioner. 
(Fishier Depo. p. 15) 
There is evidence to suggest that the explanatory note 
prohibiting Atkinsons suing tortfeasors without JHC's consent was 
not part of the court approved settlement agreement. Judge 
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Fishier could not recall the explanatory note as being part of 
the proceedings. 
Q: [M]r. Fishier, . . . do you recall whether 
the, . . proposed release and explanatory 
note were attached to the petitions in the 
Chad Atkinson proceeding? 
A: I can't recall. 
Q: Did you read the explanatory note on the day 
you entered your approval of Chad Atkinson's 
claim? 
A: I can't recall. 
A: [I] can't say that I've ever seen this 
document before. 
(Fishier depo. p. 15, 16, 17.) 
It is no wonder the Judge couldn't recall the explanatory 
note. The billing statement generated by Morgan, Scalley & 
Reading shows that the explanatory note was noL prepared until 4 
days after the court hearing. A copy is attached in the addendum 
of this brief. 
Section 78-33-2 of the Declaratory Judgment Act provides: 
Any person interested under a . . . written 
contract. . . may have determined any 
question of construction. . . under the . . . 
contract. . . and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal regulations 
thereunder. 
Further, §78-33-3 of the same act states: 
A contract may be construed either before or 
after there has been a breach thereof. 
The Atkinsons properly brought their declaratory action to 
have the Court determine whether IHC would pay all therapy, 
custodial care and institutional costs. They also properly 
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brought this action to determine their legal right or status to 
sue other tortfeasors, without IHC's consent. 
At the hearing on IHC, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott 
Olsen's motions for summary judgment, the trial court was 
informed of the declaratory judgment part of the lawsuit. 
Mr. Gardiner: Nothing yet has been said 
about the declaratory 
action part of the 
lawsuit, so naturally I 
would like to. The first 
part of the declaratory 
action we ask the Court 
to determine what the 
contract was to mean when 
it provided for medical 
costs and home care 
costs. . . .There is a 
dispute as to what 
they're supposed to pay 
and what they're not 
supposed to pay. So we 
have asked for the 
Court's guidance... 
The second issue, your 
honor, . . . In the 
release. . . approved in 
the Court provides that 
Atkinsons could sue other 
tortfeasors. . . Four 
days later they received 
an explanatory note which 
said you can't sue other 
tortfeasors without the 
consent of IHC. So we 
brought this action to 
the Court to have you 
tell us whether we can 
sue other tortfeasors 
without the consent of 
IHC. 
(Tr. June 13, 1988; pp. 20-21.) 
The purpose of the declaratory judgment act is to permit the 
examination of legal documents and statutes to determine 
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questions of construction or validity. Lindon City v. Engineers 
Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981). 
Atkinsons action squarely meets both purposes. Atkinsons 
asked the Court to construe the contract to determine what costs 
IHC must pay and to determine the validity of the explanatory 
note. Judge Young's decision should be reversed and remanded for 
trial of the declaratory action. 
POINT TEN 
THE COURT ABUvSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING ATKINSONS' MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT. 
A. Introduction. 
Atkinsons do not concede that their claims are for medical 
malpractice. See Points Five and Six of this brief. However, 
prior to the summary judgment hearing, Atkinsons moved to amend 
their Complaint. The amended complaint did three things: 
(1) It changed the formula for calculating damages to the 
value of the prior claim less the value of the settlement; 
(2) It clarified Atkinsons' claims against Morgan; 
(3) It alleged a claim for medical malpractice. The 
Atkinsons filed their Notice of Intent to Commence Action with 
the medical pre-litigation panel on January 8, 1988. On April 
18, 1988 the panel determined the Atkinsons' claims had merit. 
Atkinsons moved to amend their Complaint on June 6, 1988. (R. 
525.) 
Judge Young denied the Motion to Amend because "I believe 
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that the Motions for Summary Judgment dispose of that. 
(Tr., p. 45.) 
B. The Lower Court Abused Its Discretion. 
Amended complaints, like Atkinsons amended complaint, which 
clarify issues, and supply previous factual omissions, are 
looked upon with favor by the Courts. e.g. McGavin v. Preferred 
Ins. Exchange, 7 U.2d 161, 320 P.2d 1109 (1958); Spell v. 
McDaniel, 591 F.Supp. 1090 (E.D.N.C. 1984). Further, a change in 
legal theory does not justify a denial of a motion to amend. 
e.g. Ward Electronics Service, Inc. v. First Commercial Bank, 
819 F.2d 496 (4th Cir. 1987). 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 15, provides that leave to 
amend shall be freely given when jus Lice so requires. This 
rule, permitting amendments, is to be liberally construed to 
further the interests of justice. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 U.*2d 
165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971) . 
Further, while the trial court has some discretion, a motion 
to amend should not be denied if the motion is not frivolous, nor 
brought in bad faith and creates no undue prejudice. e.g. United 
States v. 1984 Chevrolet Transtar, 623 F.Supp. 625 (CD. Conn. 
1985) . 
In this case no one alleged 
(1) the Motion to Amend was frivolous; or 
(2) brought in bad faith; or 
(3) created any undue prejudice. 
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The motion to amend was denied simply because the 
defendants' motions for summary judgment were granted. Each of 
the respondents' arguments for granting the summary judgment have 
been previously addressed in this brief. However, the idea that 
the malpractice statute of limitations would bar Atkinsons' 
malpractice claim deserves further analysis. 
Assuming arguendo that Atkinsons alleged a claim for medical 
malpractice; the medical malpractice statute of limitations does 
not begin to run until Atkinsons discover the tortfeasor's 
conduct. e.g. Yerkes v. Rockwood Clinic, 527 P.2d 680 (Wash App. 
1974) . 
As discussed in Point Eight above, Atkinsons did not 
discover the extent of their child's injury and the falsity of 
IHC, Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen's 
misrepresentations until Chad was 3 years older, March 3, 1986. 
The 2 yr. medical malpractice statute of limitations would not 
expire until March of 1988. Atkinsons commenced the medical 
malpractice action in January of 1988. Thus the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations does not bar any claim for 
medical malpractice that Atkinsons may have against IHC. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the theories raised in the lower court support a 
summary judgment dismissing Atkinsons' Complaint for malpractice 
against Steve Morgan, or for fraud and negLigent 
misrepresentation against the other respondents. This case 
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should be remanded to the district court with instructions 
allowing Atkinsons' Amended Complaint-
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ADDENDUM 
Sec. 11. [Courts open—Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall bo open, and every person, for an injury done to him 
in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy bv due course 
ofjaw, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; 
and no person shnll be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
anv fTjhiinal in this Stale, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
Tie is a parj;y. 
All laws of a general nature M*U 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction then-of, arc eiti/ens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. Xo State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States: 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
78-14-3. Definition of terms. 
Q) 'Health care provider" includes any person, partnership, associa-
tion corporation, or other facility or institution who causes to be rendered 
or who renders health care or professional services as a hospital. physi-
cian registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse-midwiie. dentist, 
d e ^ r S r i S S t . optometrist, clinical laboratory technologist, pharma-
c S D h v s S Aeranist . podiatrist, psychologist, chiropractic physician 
naturopathk phvsician. osteopathic physician, osteopathic physician and 
^ r a S l o g i s t . speech pathologist, certified socia worker social 
s ^ f c e worker social service aide, marriage and family counselor, or 
^^tio^rSoSLxncs. and others rendering similar care and services 
J e S n ^ or arising out of the health needs of persons or groups of 
l l l ^ t and officers, employee, or agents of any of the above acting in 
the course and scope of their employment. 
(29) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any 
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of 
warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon alleged personal inju-
ries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should 
have been rendered by the health care provider. 
(30> "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or furnished, 
or which should have been performed or ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient s medical care, 
treatment or confinement. 
io-i4-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Applica-
tion. 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought 
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient dis-
covers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the 
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the 
alleged act. omission, neglect or occurrence, except that: 
*a> In an action where the allegation against the health care provider 
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, 
the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the 
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left 
in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; and 
<b> In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented 
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because 
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal 
the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced 
within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use 
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent conceal-
ment, whichever first occurs. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of 
minority or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of 
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associa-
tions and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice 
actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that 
any action which under former law could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be commenced only within the unelapsed portion 
of time allowed under former law; but any action which under former law 
could have been commenced more than four years after the effective date of 
this act may be commenced only within four years after the effective date of 
this act. 
78-12-26. Within three vears. 
Within three years: 
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real property; 
except that when waste or trespass is committed by means of under-
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact? constituting such 
waste or trespass. 
• 2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, in-
cluding actions for specific recovery thereof: except that m all cases where 
the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually included in the term 
"livestock," which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without the owner's 
fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner has actual knowledge of 
such facts as would put a reasonable man upon inquiry as to the posses-
sion of the animal by the defendant. 
<3> an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that 
the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
78-33-3. Contracts. 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breac 
thereof. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1: C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-33-3. 
78-33-2. Rights, status, legal relations under instruments 
or statutes may be determined. 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose 
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of con-
struction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, con-
tract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal 
relations thereunder. 
Rule 17. Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract 
has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute mav 
sue S h i s own name without joining with Mm the party for whose benefit the 
action is brought; and when a statute so provides an action for the use or 
benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action 
shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted m the name of the 
real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after ,abjection 
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder orsubst itutaonof 
the real party in interest: and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall 
have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the 
W f a n i o r ^ o m p e t e n t p e r s o n , When an mfant or an insane or 
incompetent person is a party, he must appear either by his general guardian 
or by a guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court; in 
which the action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed m any 
case when it is deemed bv the court in which the action or proceeding is 
prosecuted expedient to represent the infant, insane or incompetent person in 
the action or proceeding, notwithstanding he may have a general guardian 
and may have appeared by him. In an action in rem it shall not be necessary 
to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be an infant 
or an incompetent person. 
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. When a guardian ad litem is 
appointed by a court, he must be appointed as follows: 
(1) when the infant is plaintiff, upon the application of the infant, if he 
is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application of 
a relative or friend of the infant. 
(2) when the infant is defendant, upon the application of the infant if 
he is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the 
service of the summons, or if under that age or if he neglects so to apply, 
then upon the application of a relative or friend of the infant, or of any 
other party to the action. 
(3) When an infant defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, 
upon motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suit-
able person to be guardian ad litem for such infant defendant, unless the 
defendant or someone in his behalf within 20 days after service of notice 
of such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such infant. 
Service of such notice may be made upon the general or testamentary 
guardian of such defendant, if he has one in his state; if not, such notice, 
together with the summons in the action, shall be served in the manner 
provided for publication of summons upon such infant, if over fourteen 
years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such service on the 
person with whom such infant resides. The guardian ad litem for such 
nonresident infant defendant shall have 20 days after his appointment in 
which to plead to the action. 
C4) when an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or 
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or 
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. 
(dj Associa tes may be sued by common name . When two or more per-
sons associated in any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership 
or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a com-
mon name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they 
may be sued by such common name; and any judgment obtained against the 
defendant in such case shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the 
same manner as if all had been named defendants and had been sued upon 
their joint liability. 
(ej Action aga ins t a nonres iden t doing bus iness in this s ta te . When a 
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of 
Utah in one or more places in his own name or a common trade name, and 
said business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superinten-
dent, or agent, said person may be sued in his own name in any action arising 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
fa) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is 
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been 
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of 
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended 
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or 
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may 
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
<b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by 
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party 
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the 
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the 
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the 
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining 
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, ii 
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense as-
serted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occur-
rence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, tk 
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
(d> Supplemental pleadings. Upon motion of a party the court may, upa 
reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve; 
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or evens 
which have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supple 
mented. Permission may be granted even though the original pleading is 
defective in its statement of a claim for relief or defense. If the court deems it 
advisable that the adverse party plead to the supplemental pleading, it shall 
so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially identical to Rule 15, F.R.C.P. 
LAY, QUINNEY 
& NEBEKER 
HMI Drsrrrl libit* 
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C ^adx^-> PAUL S. FELT (A1055) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. 
and Scott Olsen 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo-
ROGER ATKINSON, POLLY 
ATKINSON and ROGER ATKINSON 
AND POLLY ATKINSON, as 
guardians ad litem for CHAD 
ATKINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
IHC HOSPTIALS, INC. aka 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE 
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SCOTT WETZEL 
SERVICES, INC., a corporation 
SCOTT OLSEN; STEPHEN G. 
MORGAN, MORGAN, SCALLEY & 
READING and JOHN DOES I 
through X, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING THE MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF IHC 
HOSPITALS, INC., SCOTT WETZEL 
SERVICES, INC. AND SCOTT 
OLSEN AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION TO COMPEL 
Civil No. C-87-4908 
Judge David S. Young 
ooOoo-
The motion of Defendant IHC Hospitals, Inc. for summary 
judgment and the motion of Defendants Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc. and Scott Olsen for summary judgment came on as noticed 
for hearing on the 13th day of June, 1988, before the Honorable 
UINNEY 
*EKER 
•ret Bid?. 
KF. O l Y , 
U4 1 I I 
David S. Young, District Judge, with Dale F. Gardiner of 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
David B. Erickson of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell on behalf 
of Defendant Intermountain Health Care, Paul S. Felt of Ray, 
Quinney & Nebeker appearing on behalf of Defendants Scott 
Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen and Shawn McGarry of 
Kipp & Christian appearing on behalf of Defendants Stephen 
G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & Reading. Plaintiffs1 motion 
to file a second amended complaint and plaintiffs1 motion 
to compel discovery against IHC were also heard. Based upon 
the pleadings, memoranda on file, argument of counsel and 
good cause here appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant IHC!s motion 
for summary judgment be and is hereby granted and that Plaintiffs1 
Complaint against IHC is dismissed with prejudice and on 
the merits. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendants Scott Wetzel 
Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen!s motion for summary judgment 
be and hereby is granted. Plaintiffs1 Complaint against 
Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott Olsen is dismissed 
with prejudice and on the merits. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs1 motion to 
file a second amended complaint and Plaintiffs1 motion to 
-2-
iUINNEY 
'.BKKER 
srn-t Bld(? 
AKE C n v , 
i 84111 
compel discovery against Defendant IHC be and are hereby 
denied. 
7 / ^ day of \JjJLnS , 1988 
By C : <K^L, , 
i»jpoty C'.erk 
- 3 -
QUINNEY 
4EBEKER 
Descret Bldg 
I \ K I ( 11v 
i A H 8 4 1 1 1 
CERTIFICTE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order Granting The Motions for Summary Judgment 
of IHC Hospitals, Inc., Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and Scott 
Olsen and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Complaint 
and Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel was mailed, postage prepaid, 
on this Jl^day of June, 1988, to the following: 
Dale F. Gardiner 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
B- Lloyd Poelman 
David B. Erickson 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Carman E. Kipp 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
-4-
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CARMAN E. KIPP A1829 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN. PC. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
CITY CENTBE I #330 
175 EAST 4 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8«3HI 231-4 
(SOI) 521 3773 
Attorneys for Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & Reading 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ATKINSON; POLLY 
ATKINSON; and ROGER ATKINSON 
and POLLY ATKINSON, as 
guardians ad litem for 
CHAD ATKINSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
IHC HOSPITAL, INC. aka 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE 
HOSPITALS, INC., UTAH 
corporation, SCOTT WETZEL 
SERVICES, INC., SCOTT OLSEN; 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN; MORGAN, 
SCALLEY & READING; and 
JOHN DOES I thorough X, 
Defendants. 
O R D E R 
Civil No.: C87-4908 
Judge David Young 
The motion of defendants Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan, 
Scalley & Reading for Summary Judgement came on as scheduled 
for hearing on March 28, 1988 at 9:00 a.m, before the Honorable 
David Young, District Court Judge; plaintiffs being represented 
by their attorney Dale Gardiner of the firm of Robert J. DeBry 
& Associates; defendants Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley 
& Reading being represented by Carman E. Kipp of the firm of 
Kipp and Christian, P. C , and attorney Paul Felt appearing 
for Defendant Scott Wetzel and the Court having reviewed the 
briefs, affidavits and discovery materials which had been filed 
by counsel and having heard the arguments of counsel and being 
fully advised in the premises. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendants Stephen G. Morgan and Morgan, Scalley & Readings1 
Motion for Summary Judgment of no cause of action in their 
favor and against plaintiffs should be and the same is hereby 
granted. 
Dated this O day of March, 1988. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE: 
f 
B W-y-W^TS-' 
David Young 
Approved as to Form: 
9y -
aoChRISTIAN PC 
ORNEYS AT
 WAW 
CENTRE I . #300 
AST 400 SOUTH 
LT L A K E CITY 
AH 8^(11 2 3 m 
lOi) 521 3 7 7 3 
Dale Gardiner 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this 28th day of March, 
1988, a true and correct copy of the the foregoing Order, to 
the following: 
Dale Gardiner 
G. Steven Sullivan 
Robert J. DeBry 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Paul S. Felt 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Desert Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
B. Lloyd Poelman 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for IHC 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
^yX^oJ^CL^ 
JPP A N O C H R I S T I A N PC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
CITY CENTRE I # 3 0 0 
175 EAST 4 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY 
UTAH 8 4 I I I 2 3 I - 4 
(OOl) 321 3 7 7 3 
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RELEASE AND ASSIGNMENT OF ALL (TT.ATMc; 
ROGER ATKINSON and POLLY ATKINSON, husband and wife and the parol 
of Chad Atkinson, born March 2, 1983, residing at 2316 South 600 East, 
#4, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, having reached their majority, for the 
sole consideration of payment by Intermountain Health Care Hospitals 
Inc., as follows : 
Medical Cost"Protection: 
Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. will pay all medial 
costs that include, but are not limited to, treatment! hospitalization 
and therapy that are a result of the incident that toAv n i ™ ZZ 5 • 
Children's Medical Center on March 4, U S a " ™ ^ 0 ^ ^ ^ ^ " 0 ^ 
P M 1 ! ? 6 * ? 1 ^ . 1 1 0 ? ^ " 1 1 " ^ 0 ? ?nd t h e r a p y m u s t b e ^Proved by Primary Children's Medical Center as being associated with the above incident 
S ^Iflrtf* d°KS S°C' i n r^^ay'.Umi! a n y ° t h e r services * ™ ? ? ? M . to Chad Atkinson by Primary Children's Medical Center or anv r»f'w~hI~T«-v 
care facility or individual. This portion of the L r e l . T r ! u ? 6 f l t h 
medical costs will be valid and in effect until Marlh 2 1 9 9 ^ ^ ^?<?° 
Chad reaches his fifteenth birthday whichever comes first 
Monthly Payments 
15 year guarantee at $500.00 a month or $6,000 per year with * 
guaranteed payout of $90,000. 20 year guarantee after 15 yearlof 
o$f I ^ S T V * $ 1 ? ' T P e r T r f?? i±fe W i t h a 8 « « « t S d payout of $360,000. Guaranteed payments will be made to Chad Atkinso-n nr 
rnents8 P a r 6 n t S S h ° U l d ^ ^ ^  P r l ° r t 0 termination of guaranteed pay-
Payments of $1,500 per month or $18,000 t»er vea-r tn i,a «,.,,»« 4. 
Chad Atkinson should he survive beyond the gnaltltltd\lLlnrTt r° A 
above, with these contingent payments to b e ^ e until^C Teltl Tf"c^d 
Atkinson. Normal payout 65 years of $900,000. f C h a d 
Education Protection: 
Beginning on March 4, 1998, Chad, or his parents should Chad H-f* 
prior to any of these dates, will be paid $15,000 per yla? for a total 
of eight such parents co De paid on March 4th of each vear thr-^li 2 u 
0
4f *iitovot? =uf-teed **y°? °f $"0,000 toe:sj;*npSsSt ch 
ot Chad s educa t iona l expenses, i f nece s sa ry . r^y^eiiu 
Investment P ro tec t ion : 
On March 4, 2003 .; luzip sun of $50,000 w-m u* ^ - r ^ _ ^ , 
Unlorcseen I r^^*><= ^>Y the Parents: 
A one time payment of $20,000 will be paid to the paren- s uf Jhad 
upon finalizing and approval of the court, of the settlement b> twe«;i 
Primary Children1s Medical Center and the parents of Chad Atkin. ;n. 
Total guaranteed payouts to Chad or his parents: $ 7*. oOO 
Total payouts to Chad and his parents should 
Chad live a normal lifetime of 65 years: 1,280, 00 
Hereby on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor child, 
Chad Atkinson, and their heirs, executors, administrators, successors -
assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Intermountain Health Care 
Hospitals, Inc., and Primary Children's Medical Center or their agents, 
servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators, of and from any 
and all claims, actions, causes of action, demands, rights, damages, 
costs, loss of service, expenses and compensation whatsoever, which the 
undersigneds or their minor child, Chad Atkinson, now have or which may 
hereafter accure on account of or in any way growing out of any and all 
known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries 
and property damage and the consequences thereof resulting or to result 
from the accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 4th 
day of March, 1983, at the Primary Children's Medical Center. 
In addition, the undersigneds on their own behalf and on behalf of 
their minor child, Chad, for the consideration set forth above, do heret 
release all other potential tort feasors up to the amount paid by Inter-
mountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. for medical expenses, the annuity a 
the $20,000 in cash and hereby assign to Intermountain Health Care Hospi 
tals, Inc., or its successors or assigns, the Atkinsons1 claims against 
all other potential tort feasors up to the amount paid by Intermountain 
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. for medical expenses, the annuity and the 
$20,000 in cash but this re lease and assignment should in no way limit or 
affect the Atkinsons1 right to pursue claims against other potential tor 
feasors, excluding Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary 
Children's Hospital, for damages above and beyond the amount paid by 
/«ncJ m e $*>o.OOO i n eii^'ii.^ i c i s s p e c i f i c a l l y a g r e e d a n d u n ~ s t o o d 
that Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. is subrogated o ana is 
entitled to pursue the above-mentioned claims in the names of ^er 
Atkinson, Polly Atkinson or Chad Atkinson against any and all oz. r 
persons, firms, corporations, and other entities. 
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is the comprv. :.se 
of a doubtful and disputed claim, and that the payment made is not to 
be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the party or 
parties hereby released, and that said releasees deny liability therefor 
and intend merely to avoid litigation and buy their peace. 
The undersigneds hereby declare and represent that the injuries 
sustained by Chad Atkinson are or may be permanent and progressive and 
that recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making this 
release and assignment it is understood and agreed, that the under-
signeds rely wholly upon the undersigneds1 judgment, belief and know-
ledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and 
liability therefor and is made without reliance upon any statement or 
representation of the party or parties hereby released or their represen-
tatives or by any physician or surgeon by them employed. 
The undersigneds further declare and represent that no promise, 
inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made to the under-
signeds and that this release and assignment contains the entire agreement 
between the parties hereto, that the undersigneds have obtained court 
approval to enter into this release and assignment for and on behalf of 
their minor child, Chad Atkinson, and that the terms of this release 
and agreement are contractual and not mere recital. 
Neither this release and assignment nor any payment pursuant there-
to shall be construed as an admission of any liability, such being ex-
pressly denied, nor as a waiver by or an estoppel of any of the parties^ 
herein released to make claim for any damages which they sustc* °ct, 
their claims and causes of action with respect thereto being exp:: l^y 
reserved., 
*SEE EXPLANATORY NOTE ATTACHED WHICH IS A PART OF THIS AGRE". ' 
THE UNDERSIGNEDS HAVE READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND ASSIGNMENT 
AND FULLY UNDERSTAND IT. 
Signed and sealed and delivered this £ ^  day of July, 1983. 
CAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING BELOW 
GEK ATKINSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss 
m($$$>««<' 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the ^.^T^day of \J^ c/^oj^ , 1983, before me personally 
appeared Roger Atkinson and Polly Atkinson to be known to be the persons 
named herein and who executed the foregoing release and assignment,, 
Residing in S City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
EXPLANATORY NOTE 
The intent and primary purpose 'of the Atkinsons In signii;k thLS 
Release is to fully release Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, 'no. 
and Primary Children's Medical Center in consideration for the inc *y 
paid and to be paid pursuant to the Release and Assignment, but i:. 
addition to do whatever is necessary by this release, assignment 01 
otherwise to assist Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and 
Primary Children's Medical Center in getting back the money paid an» 
to be paid pursuant to this Release and Assignment from any other 
tortfeasor and for this reason, (1) the Atkinsons have released all 
other potential tort feasors but only for the purpose of allowing Inter-
mountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical 
Center to obtain contribution from all other tort feasors pursuant 
to § 78-27-40, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, up to the full 
amount paid and to be paid, and (2) the Atkinsons have assigned their 
claims to Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Child-
ren's Medical Center up to the amount paid and to be paid for the purpose 
of allowing Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary 
Children's Medical.Center to seek full reimbursement from all other 
tort feasors up to the full amount paid out and to be paid. 
This Release and Assignment, however, is also intended and a 
secondary purpose of it, is not to discharge the other potential tort 
feasors from the Atkinsons' claims, but only to reduce the Atkinsons' 
claims against the other tort feasors by the amount paid and to be paid 
by Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's 
Medical Center or the percentage of fault attributable to Intermountain 
Health Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical- Center, which-
ever is greater, as provided for in § 78-27-42, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, as long as this secondary purpose does not preclude 
the primary purpose, as set forth above, from being accomplished. 
Thus, in accordance therewith, in the event an action is commenced 
by the Atkinsons and/or in their name against any other tort feasor 
for claims arising out of the incident of March 4, 1983, and any other 
tortfeasor commences litigation against Intermountain Health Care 
Hospitals, Inc. or Primary Children's Medical Center, for contribution 
and/or indemnity by counterclaim, cross-claim, third-party complaint 
or otherwise, the Atkinsons hereby consent that the relative degrees of 
fault of each tortfeasor shall be determined in terms of percentages 
in the action commenced by the Atkinsons and/or in their name. If a 
final determination in the Atkinsons' litigation is made that Intermoun-
tain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. or Primary Children's Medical Center 
is responsible for any percentage of the damages sustained by Chad 
Atkinson, the total amount of Chad Atkinson's damages shall be reduced 
before judgment is entered against any other tort feasor by an amount 
equal to such percentage. The judgment entered shall then be payable 
first to Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. up to the amount paid 
by it for medical costs, the annuity and the $20,000 in cash and the 
balance remaining shall be payable to the Atkinsons for and on behalf 
of Chad Atkinson. 
It is also understood and agreed that no action will be filed by 
the Atkinsons against any other potential tort feasor without he prior 
written consent and approval of Intermountain Health Care Hos-p.. als, 
Inc. We_understand that Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, I: -. may 
not be willing to give its written consent and approval because i.-'ch 
an action would in all probability result in Intermountain Health 
Care Hospitals, Inc. and Primary Children's Medical Center being n»'-ied 
as a party against whom contribution would be sought and in light o.' thi 
publicity which might attend such a case, Intermountain Health Care 
Hospitals, Inc. may wish to avoid such exposure. However, if such ar> 
action is filed, with such written consent and approval, then it is 
understood and agreed that any judgment collected or settlement receive 
will be paid first to Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. up to 
the amount paid and to be paid under the Release and Assignment and 
the balance remaining to the Atkinsons. The Atkinsons specifically 
grant their authority and permission to Intermountain Health Care 
Hospitals, Inc. to make demand upon all other potential tort feasors 
for the full amount of the Atkinsons' claims, and to accept a settle-
ment of the entire claim up to the amount paid and to be paid by 
Intermountain Health Care Hospitals, Inc. pursuant to this Release and 
Assignment. It is understood and agreed that Intermountain Health Care 
Hospitals, Inc. may desire to seek out and determine such settlement 
opportunities without the necessity of filing suit or legal actions 
against other potential tort feasors. 
THE UNDERSIGNED HAVE READ THE FOREGOING EXPLANATORY NOTE AND FULtt 
UNDERSTAND IT AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT IS PART OF THE RELEASE AND ASSIGN-
MENT OF ALL CLAIMS. 
Signed, sealed and delivered this A 1? day of July, 1983. 
CAUTION: READ BEFORE SIGNING BELOW 
ertr Atkinson '/ 
%&M&F° 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
s s . COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On the -z6> day of July, 1983, before me personally appeared Roger 
Atkinson and Polly Atkinson, being known to me to be the persons named 
herein and who executed the foregoing Explanatory Noj 
My Commission Expires 
JOTARY PUBLIC^ 
Residing in Sa City, Utah 
LAW OFFICES 
M O R G A N , S C A L L E Y & R E A D I N G 
STEPHEN G MORGAN
 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION OF COUNSEL 
FORD G SCALLEY orr-o^^ r, r^D G B>-A«NE DAVIS 
J BRUCE READING SECOND FLOOR 
STEVEN K WALKENHORST 26> E A S T 3 ° ° SOUTH 
MARK L ANDERSON
 S A L T L A K E C J T Y U T A H 8 ^ f | , 
BRAD HOLM 
(801) 531-7870 
J u l y 27 , 1983 
Mr. Scott Olsen $Y<3 | &C 
Scott Wetzel Services ,nao 
833 East 4th South
 M\\ % 8 w°° 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 : U -
FOR PROFESS.ONAL SERVICES RENDERED ^ • A t k i n s o n v s . I n t ermoun t a i n H e a l t h Care 
H o s p i t a l s , I n c . 
4/83 Conference with Scott Olsen, intra office conference, legal 
research, work on petitions, and telephone call to Mrs. 
Atkinson 1.50 hrs. 
5/83 Preparation of Petition and Consents and telephone conference 
to Scott Olsen 1.50 hrs. 
9/83 Review of petition and intra office conference .50 hrs. 
0/83 Intra office conference, two telephone conferences with Scott 
Kelly, two telephone conferences with Rick Johnson, telephone 
call to Mr. Atkinson, revise petition and release and prepare 
acceptance of conservatorship, order approving settlement 
and letters of guardianship 3.00 hrs. 
1/83 -Two telephone conferences with Scott Kelly, telephone to 
Design Benefits, Inc., intra office conference, revise 
petition and preparation of release and assignment and 
conference with Atkinson 4.50 hrs, 
STEPHEN G MORGAN 
FORD G SCALLEY 
J BRUCE READING 
STEVEN K WALKENMORST 
MARK L ANDERSON 
BRAD HOLM 
LAW O F F I C E S 
M O R G A N S C A L L E Y <& R E A D I N G 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
S E C O N D F L O O R 
2 6 1 E A S T 3 0 0 S O U T H 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8*111 
(SOI) 5 3 1 - 7 8 7 0 
OF COUNSEL 
G BLAINE DAVIS 
Mr. Olsen 
July 27, 1983 
Page Two 
Atkinson vs. Intermountain Health Care 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
7/22/83 Conference with Atkinsons and attendance at Court hearing to 
obtain approval and obtaining of bond 
7/26/83 Preparation of explanatory note and conference with Atkinsons 
and Scott Olsen and obtaining certified copies at court and 
letters to Atkinsons and Intermountain Health Care c/o 
Scott Olsen 
17.50 hours at $75.00 per hour --- $1,312.50 
3.50 hrs 
3.00 hrs, 
17.50 hrs 
COSTS: 
"Filing petition $ 50.00 
Premium for Bond 70.00 
4 Certified copies 75.20 
Xerox copies 3.40 
198.60 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE: $1,511.10 
